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No. 6218 
In the Supreme Court 
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Respondents. 
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GARDNER & LATIMER, 
ru1 ;\ ·1
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
I~EXNETH ,,~RITE, 
.App-ellant, 
YS. 
• KENNETH J. PINNEY, doing bus-
iness as the PINNEY BEVERAGE 
CoiVIPA~Y, and A. C. NEsLEN, 
Respondents. 
No. 6218 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FA·CTS 
Ordinarily the respondent neHd make only a very 
short resume of the facts involved. But in the present 
appeal the appellant's Abstract of Record is so incom-
plete, sketchy and garbled and his Statement of Facts 
in his brief so one-sided that the respondent deems it 
necessary, in the interest of fairness, to present the 
facts more fully than is usually required. 
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THE SURROUNDING CONDITIONS. 
The accident here involved occurred on December 
23, 1938, at about 4:30 P. M. and on Highland Drive 
in the vicinity of a florist's shop numberHd 2333 on that 
street. This is about two blocks south of the Sugar 
House business district. At this point the street is over 
40 feet wide; paved with block asphalt over cement; 
a street car track was located in the center; and in gen-
eral the surface was rough, (.White, Tr. 27-28). High-
land Drive just s-outh of Sugar House is extensively used 
by motor vehicles and on the day of the accident-just 
two days before Christmas-the traffic was particularly 
heavy, (White, Tr. 28). The plaintiff had parked his 
own truck on the west side of the street opposite 2333, 
the Maxwell Floral Shop. The truck faced south, was 
parallel to the cement curh and only a few inches away 
from the curb. The street was dry and visibility was 
good. 
THE PLAINTIFF 'S· ACTION'S. 
After parking his truck the plaintiff crossed the 
street to the Maxwell F1oral Shop, conversed with Mr. 
Maxwell and returned to his truck. Then Mr. Maxwell 
joined him to accept delivery of ·Some flowers. Both 
stood at the back or north end of the truck facing it, 
White just to the west of Maxwell. White testified that 
prior to and at the time of the accident he did not even 
look to the east across the street or to the north or south 
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to see if he 'Yas in any danger from passing vehicles, 
(TI". 28-29). 
\\1lile so standing, \\Thite was struck on the left front 
part of his left leg about six inches above the bottom of 
his foot. He testified that the impact knocke·d his foot 
off the ground and caused the back part of the same 
leg· to strike ag·ainst the bottom edge of the open truck 
door. He picked up the object which struck him and 
discovered it to be a small metal wheel about six or 
seven inches in diameter, with a hard rubber tread and 
weighing· about seven pounds. White then looked out 
on the street and sa'v the defendant's truck going north. 
\\~bite did not see the truck at all until it was already 
150 to 200 feet past him, (Tr. 9, 29). He then got in his 
own truck, turned around t.o the north and follo-wed the 
defendant's truck to the Dixie Inn, about 2160 South 
Highland Drive, and just south of the Southeast Furn-
iture Company, where the driver of the defendant's truck 
stopped to make a delivery .of beer. 
THE DEFENDANT'S TRUCK. 
The truck belonged to the Pinney Beverage Company 
and was a four cylinder, llfz ton International. At the 
time of the accident, its load consisted of slightly over a 
ton, including two barrels of beer and the balance in cases 
of bottled beer, (Neslen, Tr. 127-128). The defendant, 
N eslen, was the regular driver of this particular truck 
and be had the witness, Sharp, as his helper. To assist 
in delivering barrels of beer to customers, the Inter-
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national truck had as part of its regular equipment a 
small hand truck. This hand truck was carried under-
neath the left side ·of the truck body and. was securely 
attached to the chassis by some clamps at both ends. In 
the travelling position the handles were on the inside 
and the wheels on the outside, (Neslen, Tr. 128-129). 
Both the driver, Neslen, and his helper, Sharp, testified 
that the hand truck was in its regular position at the 
time of the accident, and was never carried in any other 
n1anner; but White claimed that when he saw the big 
truck at the Dixie Inn immediately following the acci-
dent, the little hand truck was hanging in some manner 
from the left top side of the truck body. 
At the request of the attorney for the plaintiff and 
with the consent of the attorney for the defendants, the 
jury was allowed by the Court to take a view of the 
International truck with the hand truck in place. The 
hand truck was later brought into Court and exhibited 
to the jury separately. 
The tw·o wheels on the hand truck are held in place 
on the shaft by cotter pins, (Neslen, Tr. 149). Neslen 
greased the wheels once or twice a week, (Neslen, Tr. 
149), and in so doing had never noticed anything out of 
order. The hand truck had been used several times on 
the day of the accident, the last time being at Murray, 
from where the defendant's truck was driven to make a 
delivery at 48th ·south and Highland Drive and thence 
along the latter street to the scene •of the accident. When 
used in Murray, the hand truck from all appearances 
"ras in perfect working order. 
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THE ACCIDENT. 
Having· n1ade deliYery of some barrels of beer at 
:Jlurray with the use of the hand truck, Neslen drove the 
Internationftl truck to 48th South and Highland Drive 
to leave some bottled beer and then drove north towards 
Sug·ar House. X eslen testified that \vhen he passed 
the site of the accident, he \Vas driving 20 to 25 miles 
an hour, (Tr. 13:2), and his helper, Sharp, agreed, (Tr. 
134), but \\~hite \vho never saw the truck until it had 
gone past him 150 to 200 feet guessed the speed at 50 
mile-s per hour (Tr. 9, 10). 
Xeslen passed by the plaintiff without knowing any-
thing· had happened and proceeded on to the Dixie Inn 
at :2160 Highland Drive. The plaintiff never saw the 
defendant's truck until after the wheel had hit him. At 
the Dixie Inn immediately thereafter, White showed 
Keslen the wheel and Neslen, upon investigation, found 
it had become detached from the hand truck. That was 
the first information Neslen or Sharp had that an acci-
dent had occurred. 
There is no evidence in the record to show hovv the 
wheel became detached ·Or that either of the defendants 
I 
had previously known ~of any defect on the hand truck. 
In fact, all the evidence is undisputed that the routine 
inspections and lubrication of the hand truck once or 
twice weekly had shown no defects in it. 
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TI-IE PL·AINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
The blow struck by the wheel on the front part of 
the plaintiff's leg was not a cut but ~only a bruise, (Dr. 
Clawson, Tr. 80, 81). No surgery or treatment of any 
kind was necessary or given. On the back of the leg was 
a cut about 1j2 inch long and not deep, (Dr. Clawson, 
Tr. 79). White saw Dr. Clawson the next day after 
the accident at the latter's office and drove his own truck 
from East Mill Creek to Salt Lake City to do so, (Tr. 
18-20). Within the next week or ten days, he saw the 
doctor twice more at the latter's office, but all medical 
treatment was completed about January 1st, slightly 
more than a week ·after the accident. 
White continued to drive his truck and with a helper 
delivered his flowers. He admitted he never lost a day's 
work, (Tr. 19-21), following the accident but claimed 
to have undergone some pain and suffering. 
The plaintiff is 33 years old, weighs 212 pounds, 
lost no weight following his mishap and his appetite 
remained unimpaired, {White, Tr. 44-45). 
BRIEF O·F ARGUMEN·T. 
I. 
The defendants were not liable for any latent defect 
in the mechanism of their truck of 'vhich they had no 
knowledge' and which a reasonable inspection and mainten-
ance did not reveal. 
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A. The undisputed evidence shows that the defend-
ants had no knowledge of any such defect and that a 
reasonable inspection and use of the hand truck had not 
revealed it. 
B. The plaintiff offered no evidence whatsoeve,r that 
the defendants had knowledg·e of such a defect or that they 
were in any manner negligent in their inspection, mainten-
ance or use of the hand truck. 
II. 
Under the pleadings and in accordance with the evi-
dence presented on the oontributory negligence of tlie 
plaintiff, the District Court was not only wholly justified 
but compelled to instruct thte jury on that subject, parti-
cularly when the plaintiff-appellant himself requested such 
instructions; and the Court's instructions, so given, are 
entirely correct. 
Til. 
Under the facts of this case the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur does not apply and the plaintiff was certainly not 
entitled to a peremptory instruction that the defendants 
were negligent as a matter of law; but in that connection. 
the District Court went as far as possible in its Instruction 
No. 14 in favor of the plaintiff to the effect that the situa-
tion warranted an "inference of negligence." 
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.ARJGUME'NT. 
While ~the appellant states s-even points in his brief 
i·n support of his appeal, they can be 1boiled down to three 
contentions, namely: 
(a) That the District c·ourt'·s instructions regard-
ing the supposed defe0t in the defenda:n ts' truck whi.ch 
caused the wheel to be-come loose were erroneous. 
(h) That the District Court's instructions on the 
subject of contributory negligence were erroneous. 
(.c) That under the doctrine of res ipsa. loquitur the 
DiSJtrict Court ·should have g:r.a'nted a directed verdict 
for the plaintiff. 
Tlhe respondent will discuss these propositions in the 
order just enumerated, although a different order is used 
in the appellant's brief. 
I. 
The defendants were not liable for any latent defect 
in the mechanism of their truck of which they had no 
knowledge and which a reasonable inspection and mainten-
ance did not reveal. 
A. The undisputed evidence shows that the defend-
ants had no knowledge of any such defect and that a rea-
sonable inspection and use of· the hand truck had not 
revealed it. 
B. The plaintiff offered no evidence whatsoever that 
the defendants had knowledge of such a defect or that they 
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were in any manner negligent in their inspection, Inainten-
ance or use of the hand truck. 
(Court's Instructions Nos. 1'2, 13, & 14). 
B·efore presenting· the authorities on 1the duty of the 
defendants in this resp·ec.t, it will be helpful to revievv 
the facts concerning· it. 
N eslen, the driver o.f the defendants' truck and his 
assistant, Sharp, never even knew any accident had hap-
pened until the plaintiff ·showed them the little wheel from 
the hand truck at the Dixie Inn shortly after it had struck 
the plaintiff. Until that time they were wholly unaware 
that the wheel had come off. Indeed the undisputed testi-
mony shows· that they h·a·d used the han·d tru·ck all morn-
ing and afternoon, the last time at Murray less than an 
hour before the accident took plaee-and that a.t all th·ese 
times, the truck appeared in entirely p:voper woTking 
order. 
Neslen testified that he had driven th·e International 
truck with the accompanying hand truek for at least a 
year without any trouble. Moreover, he had lubricated 
and inspected the wheels on the hand tru~ck regularly once 
or twice a week, (T. 149), and found everything in proper 
order. The previous use ,o.f the hand truck on the day 
of the mishap showed the same result. Thus the evidence 
is entirely without any dispute wJhatsoever that the de-
fendants had no knowledge of any defect regarding the 
wheels on the hand truck and although a rea.so!lahle in-
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speetion, made regularly, had been made, they knew of 
no defect whats·oever. 
On the other hand, the plaintiff did not offer one 
wovd of ·evidence in the entire case concerning .any sup-
posed knowledge of a defect on the pa.rtt of the defend-
ants. Neither wa.s the slightest evidence produced that 
the inspection regularly carried ·On by the defendants was 
either negligent or unreasonable under the .circumstances. 
All that 1the record shows is that the plaintiff, while stand-
ing ·On the west side of a well traveled hi~hway, was 
struck on the leg by a little wheel. He never ·saw the 
wheel before it struck him and never saw th·e def.endants' 
truck until it wa.s 150 to 200 feet past him going north. 
La.ter it ·developed that the wheel had beeome d·etached 
from the defendants' ihand truck. 
Thus the reco-rd is completely silent as to any neg-
ligent aets or omissions of duty ·On the part of the de-
fendants. The respondents were an·d still are firmly of 
the opinion that, on the re-cord, the District Court should 
have granted the defendants' motion for a non-suit and 
certainly their motion for a directed ve:vdict. 
There is now, and for many years has been, no dis-
pute in the rule of law fixing the responsilbili ty of the 
owner of a motor vehicle for defects in his machine. 
First we cite from the most recent texts ~on automobile 
laws: 
4 Blashfield: Cyclopedia. of Automobile Law arnd 
Practice, Sec. 233.3, ( 1936) : 
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~~Save \Yhere definite statutory requirements 
respecting the necessary equipment of motor ve-
hicles are not complied 'Yi th, s:O· as to 1nake out a 
case of negligence per se b~T reason thereof, the 
general rule respecting injuries attributable to de-
fects in the eondi tion of t~he automobile is that a. 
gratuitous inYi,tee riding therein as the guest of 
the owner, or driver, accepts the machine ·of his 
host as he finds it, subject to the limitation that 
the host must not in effect se1t a trap by knowingly 
or .eulpably exposing in vi tees to the risk created 
by a known or obvious defect in the auto.mobile 
or otherwise be guilty of active negligence in this 
connection contributing to the injury of guests. 
A tra:p, within the m-eaning of such rule, is a hid-
den danger lurking u·pon the premises, or in the 
automobile which is known to the host or should 
be kno-w·n to him in the disc~arge of the duty for 
a passenger's safety whic.h the law imp-oses on 
him and which the guest may avoid if he knows 
of it. 
Stated differently, he is not liable for injuries 
suffered iby guests by reason of the defective con-
dition ·o.f the automobile, in the absence of some 
showing, that he knew, or, in the exercise for the 
safety of gratuitous passengers, should have 
known, of the existence of the def.ect, the question 
of whether he did have such knowledge or notice 
·of the defe·ct as to render him liable being one of 
fact. 
The fact that the me~hanical defect produc-
tive of the injury is one discoverable upon an in-
spection of the .car does not show negligence on 
the part of the host nor authorize a. reco;very by 
the guest, and gross negligence cannot be p-re-
dicted upon a. failure to inspect the v·ehicle thor-
ouo-hly before inviting another to ride; 11he motor-
is·{is duty in this ennne·ction, if any, being limited 
to the exercise of slight care. If he thinks the 
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automobile is in good or reasonably safe condi-
tion, although it is not, that ordinarily relieves 
him from any liability for defects therein.'' 
While the rule stated applies to passengers, it is 
equally pertinent to eas·es of injury suffered by 01ther 
persons as in the present case. 
3 Hu.ddy: ·Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, (9th ed.), 
.sec. 71: 
''~Generally .speaking, it is the duty ,of one 
operating a motor vehicle on the public :highways 
to see that it is in reasonably good -condition and 
properly equipped, so ·that it may be .at all times 
con trolled, and ·not be,come a source of danger to 
its occupants or to other travelers. 
To this end, the owner or operator of a motor 
vehicle must exercise reas·onable ear·e in the in-
spection of the machine, and is chargeable with 
notice of everything ·that .such inspe,ction would 
disclos-e. T1his rule applies whether the operator 
is the owner of the vehicle or rents it from anoth-
er, or permits another to use it, or lets it to anoth-
er for hire. But, in the aibsence of anything to 
show that the appliances were defective, the owner 
or driver is not required to ins.pe.ct them before 
using the car or permitting it to be used.'' 
Innum·erable .cases may be found which hold no lia-
bility on the part of the owner ~rhere an outsider has 
been injured by a defective .mechanism which was un-
known to the owner and had not been disclosed by a rea-
s-onable inspe.c.tion. ·Only a few of the m·ore recent cases 
will be ~i ted. 
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Ph ill ips l'. PickuN~ck Stages, · 
(California _..'-\ pp., 1927), 259 P. 968. 
Her-e the plaintiff wns injured as t1he defendant's bus 
struck hiln, \\~hen the driYer \Yas unable to stop the lbus 
because the foot brake pedal suddenly broke. The verdict 
for the plaintiff \Yas upheld because of the defendant's 
violation of a statute, but on the point involved here the 
Calif.ornia. Court stated: 
H Appellant contends that t1he accident was 
caused -solely by the sudden breaking of the f.oot 
peda.l, due to a. latent defect therein, not known to 
defendant and not disc-overable upon a most care-
ful inspection, and that there was no negligence 
upon the part of the defendant. ·Concededly, if the 
s-ole proximate cause .of the accident vva.s due to 
the breaking of the foot ·p·edal due to a latent de-
fect which eould _not have been dis.c.overed upon a 
careful examination and inspection, appellant 
would not be liable. '' 
Bolin~ v. Corliss Company, 
(Mass., 1928), 159 N. E. 612. 
The tire and rim of the defendant's .car became de-
ta·ched from the wheel and, after rolling across the street, 
struck the plaintiff. U·nder facts vvhich the opinion states, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined 
th-ere was no liability. 
"The second count is to tjhe effect that it vva.s 
the defendant's duty bef-o-re permitting the use 
of the automobile upon the public highways to 
have the automobile in reasonably saf.e condition; 
that 'the defendant negligently permitted said 
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automobile to go out upon the highway in. such a 
defective and dangerous ,condition that a t1re and 
rim ·came off and s·eriously injured the plaintiff.' 
There was no·thing to show that, at the time the 
defendant gave permission to Casper to· use the 
automobile, it had any knowledge the machine was 
then defective or unsafe for use on the public 
highways; and no- ·evidence to support the plain-
tiff's .contention that at t1hat time the rim or tire 
was defective, or, even if it vvere defective, that 
reasonalble inspection would have disclosed its 
condition. Assuming that the defendant would 
be liable in. permittitn.g Casper to use a. defective 
automobile when it knetv of the defect or, as a 
reasonably prudent person, could ha:ve discovered 
it, the plaintiff did not show that the defendant 
pos-sessed such kno-vvledge or that the defect, if it 
then existed, mig1ht reasonably have bee:n dis-
covered." (Italics ours.) 
Westlund v. Iverson, 
(Minn., 1922), 191 N. W. 253. 
While driving along a road the left rear wheel of the 
defendant's automobile became detached, rolled onto an 
adja.c.ent footh pat1h and struck the plaintiff. There was 
no evidence of previous kno\vledge of any defective con-
dition or of faulty inspection by the defendant. The Su-
preme Court of Minnesota sustained a. directed verdict 
in favor of the defendant. 
Flores v. Sullivan, 
(Texas, 19·37), 112 S. W. ( 2d) 321. 
The defendant taxi cab driver had a spare wheel .se-
·curely fastened on the rear ·of his cab. A negligent driver 
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of another ra.r strnrk the cab and broke the spare wheel 
loost"). It rolled into the street and struck the plaintiff. 
It \Yas held that in the absence of an~T proof that the spare 
tire 'Yas not fastene·d securely, th·e plaintiff eould n-ot 
reeoYer, such a remote .contingency as actually occurred 
not being reasonaibly foreseeable. 
Cherry L~ke Farms v. Taylor, 
(1939), 98 F. (2d) 571; 
Phillips c. Britannia Laund1"Y Co·., 
(England, 19·23), 12 B. R. C. 418, 437. 
See also the numerous case·s cited in foot notes by 
Blash:field and Huddy, quoted above. 
The appellant complains that! the \District c·ourtt . 
. 
erred in its instructions on the question of the defend-
ants' actual knowledge and negligent insp·ection. To 
support his argument he plucks out part of the last sen-
tenee of Instruction 13 and places a far fetched interpre-
tation on it-wholly inconsistent with the actual context 
itself. Actually the ·Court gave three full instru.ctions on 
this .subject-No. 12, No. 13, and No. 14. A reading of all 
these three instructions taken together-.a·s they must be 
-shows that the District Court fully and clearly told the 
jury what the law was-all in accordance with the well 
established rules discussed a.bove. 
The appellant '.s contention as to this point is wh·olly 
without merit. 
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II. 
Under the pleadings and in accordance with the evi-
dence presented on the contributory negligence of the 
plaintiff, the District Court was not only wholly justified 
but compelled to instruct the jury on that subject, parti-
cularly when the plaintiff -appellant himself requested such 
instructions; and the Court's instructions, so given, are 
entirely correct. 
(Instructions Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10.) 
The answer ·of the defendants contains the following 
affirmative defense of ·contributory negligence, (A. 11-
12): 
''Further ~answ·ering the con1plaint of plain-
tiff :and hy way of an affirmative defense thereto 
the defendants allege that on the 23rd day of 
December, A. D. 1938, the plaintiff was standing 
on the travelled portion of the highway at about 
2330 South Highland Drive in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and while being ·s'o' then and there, and im-
mediately prior to and at the time of the aecident 
alleged in the complaint, the plain tiff acted in a 
n·egligent, ·oar.eless, imprudent manner in this: 
tha:t at said time :and place the plaintiff failed to 
observe any lookout for vehi,cles passing the point 
where he ·was standing rand took no precautions 
whats,oever to protect himself against being in-
jured in any ma:nn·er .by said vehicles so passing 
while the plaintiff was then and there .standing in 
the travelled p·ortion of the sraid highway; that if 
a small wheel from the hand-truck attached to the 
defendant's truck did become d·etached therefrom 
a.nd strike the plaintiff's leg, then such a~ccident 
and collision was the sole proximate result of the 
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neg-ligence ~and carelessness of the plaintiff as 
hereinabove set f~orth and \vas not caused proxi-
mately or a.t all by any negligent act or omission 
on the part of tthe defendants or either of them.'' 
Under this defense the defendants offered a sub-
stantial amount of evidence show·ing the plaintiff to he 
g-uilty of contributor~~ negligence, both by their own vvit-
nesses and by cross examination of the plaintiff's 
witnesses. 
The Court should 'bear these facts in mind : The 
scene of the accident was two blocks south of the tremen-
dously busy Sugar House business district on Highland 
Dri\e. Tthe time \vas two days bef,o-re Christmas when 
the traffic was unusually heavy. Highland Drive at this 
point is a. busy thoroughfare much travelled by motor 
vehicles. The plaintiff drove over the scene of the acci-
dent four or five times a week and per·sonally knew of 
the heavy traffic. The plaintiff was standing in the 
street-in the travelled portion ·of the highWta.y and not 
on the sidewalk. 
Surely under .such conditions a. person is required 
to take some measures to protect himself. Y·et the plain-
tiff admitted on ~cross ·examination that he did absolutely 
nothing to ·save himself from any traffic injury. Let him 
speak for himself, (T. 28-30): 
Q. ·''You were -conversant with the condition of 
traffic on that street~ 
A. I stop'Ped .at that .address-
Q. I mean in general~ 
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A. (Continued). Approximately four or five 
times a week. 
Q. And have done f.or s•ome time~ 
A. Y·es. 
Q. You also knew t;hat on two days before Christ-
mas there would be mor·e traffic than usual 
there, at 4:30 in the afternoon, didn't you~ 
That is a busy time of the day on that street, 
isn't it~ 
A. If there is any busy time that is when it would 
be. 
Q. There is a lot of traffic-you know that-on 
Highland Drive just below 21st South~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Isn't that so~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You testified to this jury that you never 
looked toward the east at all, you were stand-
ing there with some flowers in your hand, as 
I understood JIO·Ur testimony, and you hadn't 
looke·d around towar·ds the ·east at all before 
this thing hit you~ 
A. I wasn't eontemplating going across. 
Q. I didn't ask you that. I ,asked you if you 
looked towards the east at all, while you vvere 
standing there~ 
A. I was looking at my customer. 
Q. Answer my question. You didn't look to-
wards the east at all before this thing hit 
you, did you' 
A. No. 
Q. Did you look down the .street to see if any 
ears were coming at :all~ 
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~\. X ot until I "~as hit. 
(~. 
A. 
But you didn't before'? 
No. 
Q. You didn't eYeu see the truck \Yhich you say 
\Yns inYolved in this accident until it had 
passed you, you say, one hundred fifty to tvvo 
hundred feet J? 
A. That is right. 
Q. ~ou didn't look to se-e if a. tn1ck vvas go1ng 
byJ? 
A. I had no occasion. 
Q. Did you or didn't you, now~ 
A. No. 
Q. Yet, standing there, two days before Christ-
mas, on this street, with heavy traffi.c, know-
ing that cars were going ~back and forth all 
the time, both ways, ynu never even looked 
toward the east to see if there was any danger 
coming to you at all, did you~ 
A. If-
Q. Did you~ Answer that 'Yes' or 'No'. 
A. No .... '' 
Surely the foregoing testimony, considered in the 
light -of the surrounding ·circumstances, constitutes sub-
stantial evidence on the question of the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence. Consequently, the District Court 
was required to submit SllCh evidenee to· the jury with 
prop-er instru-ctions. 
It is also perfectly apparent that the proof adduced 
c-omes .clearly within the scope of the defendant's answer 
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setting up the affirmative .defense of contributory negli-
gence. Hence the case of Lo.ckhead v. Jensen, 42 Utah 
99, 129 P. 347, cited in Appellant's brief, p. 19, has no 
application in the present case. 
Any person occupying the travelled portion of a. busy 
highway is required to take some n1easures .of precaution 
to .protect himself. He cannot simply do nothing in the 
way of self-prote·ction and depend entirely on the drivers 
of p~assing vehicles to s.a ve him from injury. The kind 
and am·ount of precautionary measures he must exercise 
depends ·o:n surrounding .circumstances. The test is 
whether be did that to protect himself which a reason-
able, prudent man would have done under the ~same or 
similar circumstances. The situation, there£ore, varies 
in the case of a pedestrian, a workman or other pers-on 
occupying the travelled p,ortion of the street. The plain-
tiff here was not a workman in the sense that he was em-
ployed by .someone else to perform labor in the street. 
Neither w~a.s he strictly speaking a pedestrian merely 
moving in the street. In fact he was standing in a danger-
ous situation in the travelled part of the street on his 
own business. That certainly did not relieve him from 
exercising any pre-cautions "rhatsoever for his own safety. 
So f,ar as the- respondents are advised the latest 
pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Utah on this 
subject is Reid v. Owens, (Utah, Aug. 31, 1939), 93 P. 
(2d) 680, 6H2-3: 
''The rule that one working ·on the highway 
is not held to so high a. degree of care .as a pe-
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destrian has been applied to \Yorkmen eross1ng 
a street as a part of their \Vork. The eireun1-
stanees may be such in a particular case that a 
workman ·crossing a. street in the line of his \York~ 
tho-ug·h J1e be carrying nothing ,and doing nothing 
except crossing, \Yould not be required to exercise 
the sa!nle degree of \Yatchfulness as a pedestrian 
if barriers or signs have been placed or there is 
other eviden·ce of \York ibeing prosecuted on or in 
the immediate vicinity of the street; but such a 
workman ca.nn,o-t be said to .act as a. reasonably 
prudent pers-on under the .cir-cumstances if he is 
altogether indifferent to traffic hazards. What is 
due care depends on all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances. A workman actively laboring in 
the street must exercise due care. But that care 
must be determined from a different standpoint 
than the care to be exercised by a pedestrian on 
the same street. The former must devote some 
attention to th-e prosecution of his work; the lat-
ter is free of .any duty which would interfere with 
kee.pin·g a vigilant lookout. A driver of a vehi-cle 
being warned by barriers, signs, or other evi-
deuces of the presence of workmen in the street 
must in the ·exercise of due care be cognizant of 
~he fact that such workmen may. n:ot constantly 
attend to traffic, and his conduct should be in the 
light of such knowledge. He may not in ease of 
injury to such a workman point to the latter's 
attention to his work as negligence ·On the latter's 
part. But a pedestrian devoting so much of his 
attention to other than the traffic as the workman 
devoted to his w9rk may well be guilty of contri-
buto-ry negligence. A workman merely crossing 
a street sihould doubtless be required to be more 
watchful than one sweeping streets, shoveling 
.dirt repairing rails, or filling holes, whose duty 
not 'only compels him to be in the highway but 
also to dev;ote a very large part of his attention 
to his work. Thus, in Ellis v. Whitmeyer, supra., 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
where the workman merely crossed the bridg-e as 
ordered by lhis foreman he looked for traffic be-
fore proceeding .and left an1ple margin for cars 
traveling as warned by danger signs. Indeed, the 
eourt o-bserved, although applying the rule of 
highway wo-rkers, that the plaintiff used such care 
as would have been absence of eontributory neg-
ligence in a pedestrian. The jury's award was 
upheld against a claim of contributory negligence 
as a. matter of law.'' · 
The instructions of the District ~Court in the present 
case state this rule accurately and precisely, especially 
in Instruction No.9, (A. 46-47). 
It is interesting to note that the appellant in his brief 
has no particular ·complaint to make that the District 
Court's instructions on contributory negligence incor-
rectly state the law, but only ·that the ·Court should not 
have instructed the jury on that subject at all. 
This position becomes altogether incomprehensible 
and ludicrous when it is considered that the plaintiff-
appellant ,himself requested the Court to instruct the 
jury on. the subje.ct of eontributory negligence. This is 
found in Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 7, (T. 29): 
''If you shall find ·Or ibelieve from the evidence 
that ·nn the 23rd day of December, 19'38, in the 
2300 block on Highland Drive, the Defendant was 
standing behind his truck and that he was struck 
by a wheel which became detaclhed from a. hand 
truck hanging on the side of the truck being oper-
ated by the Defendant N eslen, then you are in-
·structed that the test for- determining whether the 
Plaintiff was contributorily negligent is what a 
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reasonable person "\Yould have done under the cir-
<?lun-stances, ·and· you are instructed t1hat negli-
g-ene.e is n·ot imputable to a person failing to look 
for da:nger if under the surrounding circumstanc.es 
he had no cause to apprehend any." 
This request by the plaintiff '\vas given by the Dis-
trict Court, and thereupon the Court was required to 
give full instructions on the subj.eet of contributory 
negligence. 
Hou· can. the appeUwnt, havi-ng specifically requested 
and received froJn tlze District Court his own instructions 
on coHtribu.tory negligence, n·OW assign as error the fact 
that the Court follo~ved his own req~test and instructed 
the jnry on. that subjBct? Some strange Assignments of 
Error no doubt come before the Suprem.e C·ourt from 
time to time, ~but the writer ~confesses he has never yet 
seen anything so naive as this. 
On the question of contributory negligence, there-
fore, no merit exists in the appe:al beeause, first, there 
was substantial, tangible eviden·ce .of the plaintiff's c.on-
tributory negligence, properly pr.esented under the plead-
ings; second, the District c·ourt was compelled to submit 
this evidence to the jury; and third, in .so doing the Court 
gave proper and correct instructions on the ·subject, in-
cluding ·One request made by the plaintiff himself. 
III. 
Under the facts of this case the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur does not apply and the plaintiff was certainly not 
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entitled to a peremptory instruction that the defendants 
were negligent as a matter of law; but in that connection 
the District Court went as f1a.T as possible in its Instruction 
No. 14 in favor of the plaintiff to the effect that the situa-
tion warranted an "inference of negligence." 
(Instruction No. 14). 
Before arguing the legal principles involved in this 
point it is well again to remind this Court of the facts 
in the present case, because cases which rely upon the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are always de-cided under 
their own specific facts. 
The plaintiff offered not one word ·Of evidence that 
the defendants had any knowledge of any defect in their 
truck or that their inspection of it had been at all neg-
ligent or unreasonable. On the other hand the defend-
ants presented proof which was not disputed that they 
not only did not know of any defect but on the contrary 
their use of the hand truck the very day of the accident 
and up to one hour before it showed it to be in good 
working order and furthermore that they lubricated and 
inspe-cted the hand truck once or twice a week. Does 
this set of facts fit into the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur? 
The Supreme Court of Utah has in/numerous cases 
discussed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The respond-
·ents here quote only from a few ~of them. 
Zoccolillio v. Oregon Short LineR. R., (Utah, 1918), 
53 Utah 39, 61-64; 177 P. 201. 
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In that case the Utah Supreme Court reviews all 
of the previous Utah cases on the subject. 
"'For the purposes of this decision we shall 
assu1ne that the n1axim res ipsa loquitur applies 
to the heating- of cars. If, however, that fact be 
assumed, yet the application .of the maxim does 
not shift the burden of proof under any circum-
stances, and. so far as "\Ve are aware, the courts 
haYe uniformly declared to the .contrary. In a 
very recent case (\\,..illiamson v. Salt Lake & 0. 
Ry. Co., 32 l; tah 84, 172 Pac. 680) we pointed out 
that the burden of proof d~oes not shift and .cited 
authority to that effect. In an exhaustive note 
to the case ·Of Hughes Y. Atlantic City, etc., Rd. 
Co., L. R. ...._-\.. 1916A, commencing at page 930, a 
very large number of cases are cited, in all of 
which the doctrine is laid do\vn that the burden 
of proof does not shift to the defendant. The 
foregoing case originated in the New Jersey 
Court .of Errors and Appeals, and is reported 
in 85 X. J. Law, 212, 89 Atl. 769, L. R. A. 1916a, 
927. We shall later refer to this case more par-
ticularly. It may therefore be confidently as-
serted that the instruction in question was er-
roneous in charging the jury that the burden of 
proof shifted to the ·defendant. 
The proposition respecting the presumption 
.of negligence is argued with much force by coun-
sel for both parties in their respective briefs. 
Defendant's counsel in effect contend that the 
maxim of res ipsa loquitur, when applicable, is 
evidentiary, and merely raises an inference ~of fact 
authorizing, but not compelling, a finding of neg-
ligence and that such is its effeet in all cases whethe~ the occurrence of the accident is ex-
plained by the defendant or not explained. Upon 
the other hand, counsel for plaintiff insist that, 
where the maxim .applies, all that the plaintiff is 
required to prove is that he was injured through_ 
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a derailment of a railroad train ·on \Yhich he was 
riding as a passenger, or by reason of a collision 
between two of defendant's trains, and that after 
making ·8Uch proof the presumption arises which, 
if unexplained, .compels a finding of negligence~ 
In other words, plaintiff's counsel eon tend that, 
under the circumstances just stated, the court 
should direct the jury that the defendant was 
guilty of actionable negligence as a matter of 
law. It will thus be seen that if the contention 
·of plaintiff's counsel is correct, then the question 
of burden of proof in most ca.ses is academic 
merely, while if the defendant's ·Counsel are right 
the ultimate fact of negligence is for the jury, in 
view of all the facts and circumstances, whatever 
those may be. In the recent case referred to, 
namely, Williamson v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry. Co., 
supra, we held to the doctrine contended for by 
defendant's counsel, following the case of Sweeney 
v. Erving, 228 U. S. 240, 33 Sup. Ct. 416., 57 L. Ed. 
815, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905. Counsel for plaintiff 
both in their brief and in the oral argument, criti-
cize the rulings both in the Williamson Case and 
in the Sw·eeney Case. If that were admitted, 
however, in view of the fact that the· Sweeney 
Case emanates from the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the court of last resort, and the 
Irving Case, just referred to, emanates fr·om 
the Court of appeals, the Sweeney Case would 
control; but an examination of the Irving Case 
will disclos·e that that ·case follows, and does not 
contradict, the Sweeney Case. It is there said, 
quoting from one ~of the decisions of the Supreme 
Court with respect to the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur: 
'' * * * When a thing which causes 
injury, without fault of the injured per-
son, is shown to be under the exclusive 
control of the defendant, and the injury is 
such as, in the ordinary course of things, 
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does not occur if the one having such con-
trol uses proper care, it affords reasonable 
evidence, in the absence of an explanation, 
that the injury aro~e fro1n the defendant's 
"'"ant of care.'' 
\\nat is there in this quotation which is 
contrarv to the S\Yeenev Case? If it affords 
merely "'reasonable eviden~ce that simply amounts 
to an inference of fact that negligence existed. 
In other \Yords, from the occurrence the jury may 
infer the ultimate fact of negligence. That is 
all that is decided in the \~Villiamson Case. That 
is all that is contended for in the Sweeney Case. 
Counsel, in effect, contend that the court must 
direct a ,~erdict as rna tter of la \V in case no ex-
planation is made. Counsel, however, also insist 
that the holding in the \\Tilliamson Case is con-
trar~~ to former holdings of this court. With 
due respect for counsel's opinion, we, neverthe-
less, are of a contrary opinion. So far as the 
writer is a \Yare, this court has considered the 
probative or evidentiary effect of the maxim of 
res ipsa loquitur in two, and only two, cases, 
namely Christensen vs. Railroad, 35 Utah, 137, 
99 Pac. 676, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 255, 18 Ann. Cas. 
1159, and Furkovich vs. Bingham Coal & Lumber 
Co., 45 Utah 89, 143 Pac. 121, L. R. A. 1915B, 
426. In both of those cases we clearly indicate 
that the effect of the maxim is evidentiary, and 
that where it applies negligence, which is the ulti-
mate fact to be established, may be inferred from 
a particular occurrence or accident. I? the Chris-
tensen Case we followed the rule la1d down by 
the Court of Appeals of New York in the case 
of Griffen v. Manice, 177 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925, 
52 L. R. A. 922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630. In view of 
counsel '·s vigorous insistence that the doctrine 
laid down in the Williams·on Case is unsound, 
we have taken special pains to again exan1ine into 
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the subject. No one, even though he has examined 
the decisions upon the subject n1erely cursorily, 
can, we think, arrive at any other conclusion than 
that the decisions are utterly irreconcilable. 
Moreover, it is just as apparent to any ·one who 
is at all conversant with the subject that most any 
one can find something to criticize in at least most 
of the decisions. Under such circumstances, the 
only reasonable, the only logical, course to pur-
sue is to keep in nrt;ind fwndamental principles 
when called upon to decide between the conflict-
ing opinions. It is fundamental that negligence is 
neither inferred nor presu,med 1nerely because a 
passenger was injured. Nor is negligence pre-
sumed as a matter of law. In that regard negli-
gence which constitutes a wrong, like fraud, must 
he established. It may, however, always be in-
ferred from other facts and particularly in cases 
between carrier and passenger, where a collision 
or derailment has occurred. It may be inferred 
from ,such ·occurrence, and \\7here no explanation 
is offered in such a case the inference may be so 
strong as not only to justify, but to compel, a find-
ing of negligence, which is the ultimate fact to be 
established. The circumstances ·surrounding the 
happenings of an accident, even ~on a railroad, 
may, however, easily be such that, while they may 
justify a finding of negligence, yet n1ay not com-
pel ,such a finding. In that regard there is no 
difference in princi pie between a case where the 
maxim of res ipsa loquitur applies and where it 
does not; that is, an inference may arise from 
one or from a series of facts in any kind of a 
case which, if unexplained, may not ~only justify, 
but may also require, a finding of the ultimate 
fact of negligence. The only difference between 
an ordinary ease and a case between carrier and 
passenger· consists in the quantun1 of proof the 
plaintiff must adduce in order to 1nake a prima 
facie case. True, courts in applying the maxim 
of res ipsa loquitur very frequently speak of the 
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presun1ption 'vhieh arises, etc. B·lJ readinq the 
decision it, hou'erer, becoHles clear that at· least 
most zurifers refer to the presumption so ca.lled 
merelY_ as an inference of fact, and not as a pre-
sum.pflon req_niring the cou.rt to direct a verdict, 
even thou.gh no explanat·ion is offered." (Italics 
ours). 
In connection \Yith the Utah cases, this court should 
keep in mind the District Court's Instruction N·o. 14 in 
the present case which reads, (A. 49) : 
''You are instructed that if you should find 
fr-om a preponderance of the evidence that the 
'• dolly'' wheel \Yas thrown or projected from 
d~fendants' truck as it passed the place where 
plaintiff was standing and struck plaintiff in-
flicting the injuries complained of, such. finding 
is alone sufficient to raise an inference of negli-
gence on the part of the defendants which you 
may, but need not apply. Unless you should find 
that such inference of negligence is ·Overcome 
from all the ·evidence in the case you should find 
for the plaintiff.'' 
Angerman Co. v. Edgerman, 
(Utah, 1930), 290 P. 169, 171. 
''In the case of Zoccolillio v. Oregon Short 
LineR. Co., 53 Utah 39, 177 P. 201, 210, this court 
expounds the doctrine of res ipsa l·oquitur and 
refers to the previous cases in this court where 
the subject has been discussed. The rule which 
is quoted with approval in that case, taken fron1 
the case of Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 240, 33 
S. Ct. 416, 57 L. Ed. 815, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905, 
is as follows: 
''When a thing which causes injury, 
without fault of the injured person, is 
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shown to be under the .exclusive control of 
the defendant, and the injury is such as, 
in the ordinary course of things, does not 
occur if the one having such control uses 
proper care, it affords reasonable evi-
dence, in the absence of explanation, that 
the injury arose fr,om the defendant's 
want of care.'' 
It is further made to appear in that ca.se 
that ''the effect of the maxim is evidentiary, and 
that where it applies negligence, which is the 
ultimate fact to be established, may be inferred 
from a particular ·occurrence or accident.'' In 
some cases the inference may be so strong, where 
no explanation is offered, as not only to justify, 
but to compel, a finding of negligence ; but ordin-
arily all that is meant by the maxim is that proof 
of the facts embraced within the statement of 
the rule affords reasonable evidence from which 
the jury, or the court, if the case be tried without 
a jury, may, in the absence of explanation by the 
defendant, infer that the injury arose from the 
defendant's want of cares.'' 
The Angerman case was printed in 79 A. L. R. 40 
and is followed on page 48 by an enlightening annota-
tion on the subject. 
Kendall v. Fordham, 
(Utah, 1932), 9 P. (2d) 183; 
Jenson v. S. H. Kress d!; Co., 
(Utah, 1935), 49 P. (2d) 958-960. 
''Appellant con tends that this case is directly 
controlled by the case of Quinn v. Utah Gas & 
Coke Co., 42 Utah, 113, 129 P. 362, 43 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 328. Respondent contends that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquiture applies. 
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,, .... e cannot see ho\v this case differs fro In the 
Quinn Case. In that case a bottle of ink had 
spilled, and plain tiff's dress was damaged by 
ink running up.on it. In this ·Case there was a 
cracked panel in the ·showcase and the person of 
plaintiff \Yas injured. In neither case did any one 
kno\Y how the ink \Yas spilled or the glass broken. 
In both cases the cause of the spilled ink or the 
broken glass 1nay haYe been caused by the cus-
tomer ''ho \Vas damag·ed or by another customer, 
·or may have been caused by some representative 
of the company \Yithout negligence and unnoticed 
when it was done, or, in both cases, it may have 
been caused by the negligence of the company 
through a serYant. The difficulty is that it is 
in the realm of speculation, and under such cir-
cumstances the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can-
not apply. It applies ''here the thing from or 
by \Yhich the apparent negligence speaks is shown 
to be under the control or the 1nanagement of the 
store and the accident is such as, in the ordinary 
course of things, does not or would not happen 
if those """ho had the management used the proper 
care. '\llere the way in which the accident hap-
pened warrants an inference of negligence then 
the mere happening speaks for itself. Even then 
it is only evidence from which the jury may infer 
negligence. It is not negligence in law. See 
Williams-on v. Salt Lake & Ogden R. Co., 52 Utah 
84, 172 P. 680, L. R. A. 1918F, 588. If the cir-
cumstances are equally consistent ·with a cause 
which would not be attributable to negligence, 
then the doctrine does not apply. The stage is set 
for the happening of the accident as the victim 
walks upon it. If, fr,onl the set stage as it was 
before the accident happened, it can be inferred 
from the setting itself that there was an omission 
or commission of the manag.ement amounting to 
negligence, then the thing itself speaks.'' 
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Such are the recent Utah cases on the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. In view of what they hold, it is per-
fectly clear that the District c;ourt 's Instruction No. 14 
exactly complied with their views. Even though an "in-
ference of negligence'' under that instruction arose, 
yet the positive evidence of the defendants that no knowl-
edge of a defect or negligence in as-certaining it existed, 
coupled with a complete lack of proof of negligence by the 
plaintiff-yet the ''inference'' was ·overcome and the 
entire question could be resolved by the jury. 
In the light of the Utah cases quoted above and 
particularly in the light of the facts of the present cause, 
it is clear that the Utah coal case of Furkovich v~. Bing-
'ham Coal and Lumber Co., 45 Utah 89; 143 P. 121, cited 
on page 9 of the appellant's brief, has no application 
here. 
It f.ollows that the appellant's attempt to avail him-
self here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is without 
merit, and if there were the slightest doubt about the 
matter it is completely resolved by the District Court's 
Instruction No. 14. 
With great deference to the Court and to opposing 
eouns.el, the wtiter of this brief, after some consider-
able experience in appellate practice, feels constrained 
to say that this is the most trivial and inconsequential 
appeal he has yet encountered. Not only is this so 
because of the weakness of the appellant's legal argu-
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ments but particularly because of the superficiality of 
the plaintiff's injuries. These facts should not be ~over­
looked: (a) the plaintiff is an able bodied man of ~3:2, 
six feet tall, "~eighing 212 pounds 'vho lost no vYeight 
or appetite follow·ing the accident; (b) the front of the 
left leg where the w·heel struck 'vas only silghtly bruised, 
and required no surgical aid and "\vas not even bandaged; 
(c) the slight ~~~ inch cut on the back of the leg was 
treated only "\Yith an antiseptic; (d) the plaintiff sa"T 
his doctor only three times ; (e) he never lost a single 
day's work after the accident but continued to drive his 
truck eYery day. Small wonder that the jury promptly 
broug·ht in a verdict of "no cause of acti,on''. 
The respondents urge this Honorable Court to affirm 
the judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARDNER & LATIMER, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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